The purpose of this paper is to analyze the real-time trading of electricity. We address a model for an auction-like trading which captures key features of the real-world electricity markets. Our main result establishes that, under certain conditions, the expected total payment to the electricity producers is independent on particular auction type. This result is analogous to the revenue equivalence theorem known for classical auctions and could contribute to an improved understanding and comparison of different electricity market designs.
production and of the electricity exchange for those on the future delivery of electricity. While the electricity exchange is similar to the usual forward market, the trading rules at the realtime market are designed to match demand and supply to continously maintain network electrical equilibrium. This requirement is preformed by auction-like trading subjected to several technical restrictions. The interested reader may find a comprehensive overview of economical issues behind the real-world electricity auctions in a recent work [2] and in the literature cited therein. This paper presents also an comparison of different auction formats analyzing the bidding behavior of electricity producers within an ogliopoly model.
Since there is a huge variation in market design (see [11] ), we face merely basic features in order to keep our model simple. In principle, an electricity auction works as follows: Each producer submits for each hour of the next day his/her schedule consisting of a bid quantity and a bid price for power which he/she is willing to sell at least at this price. The system operator arranges the bids for each hour in the increasing price order. The system price set for the current hour equals to the bid price of the last generator needed to meet the demand.
Each producer who is in merit (i.e. whose bid price was below or equal to the system price) supplies power and sells it at a price depending on the own bid price, electricity demand, and auction type as follows:
• for discriminatory auction, at the own bid price,
• for uniform auction, at the system price,
• for Vickery auction, at those system price, which would be dispatched without his/her own bid.
Other producers (with bid price above the system price) suffer a loss since they have to pay fixed costs for their idle production units. An important issue of all electricity auctions is that there is a price limitation, meaning that the system operator accepts only those bids with bid price below a pre-determined level, the so-called price cap. If the electricity demand exceeds all submitted production capacity, then the system price is set at the price cap and the electricity demand is to meet by additionally running the reserve production. Qualitatively, each producer has to solve the following individual optimization problem: the bid price is to place in such a way, that the potential gain of production is optimally balanced against the possible loss of being idle.
Classical auctions
To clearer out approach, we recall the revenue equivalence theorem for classical auctions adapting [7] and to our settings. Consider an auction in which N + 1 bidders i = 0, . . . , N compete for the possession of a single object. The private value of the object to the bidder i is denoted by V i . Suppose are (1) (V i ) N i=0 are non-negative i.i.d. random variables realized on a probability space (Ω, F, P ) such that
Assume that the bid behavior of each agent is based only on his/her own value estimation.
Thus, each participant i observes the realization v of the private value V to submit the bid
where b denotes the bid strategy chosen by the agent from the set of all admissible
Assume that the payment C i (β 0 , . . . , β N ) of each bidder i depends on bids β 0 , . . . , β N submitted by agents 0, . . . , N and is calculated by the same rule for each agent: that is, for all
Furthermore, we suppose the payment is non-negative and never exceeds his/her own bid
Consider auctions where the agent with the highest bid wins the object. Thus, if all all competitors follow b ∈ S and the agent observes the realization v of the private value, then he submits a bid maximizing the expected profit
Here we have chosen the viewpoint of the agent i = 0, due to (1) and (4), without lost of generality. Let us calculate (6) as
with expected win probability
corresponding to the bid β . An equilibrium strategy b * ∈ S is characterized by the property that, if all competitors follow b * ∈ S , then agents best choice is to choose b * , too: (1), (2), and (3) we obtain from (9) the estimate
and interchanging v andṽ the reverse estimation
Dividing (10) and (11) by v −ṽ = 0 and approaching v byṽ gives with (2)
If all bidders follow the same equilibrium strategy b * , then the revenue of the auctioneer given
where the last equality follows with (12).
Electricity auctions
Let Q > 0 be the random electricity demand modeled on a probability space (Ω, F, P ) and denotes all probability measures on the σ -algebra B(J) of Borel measurable subsets of J .
Following ν , the agent submits a random bid drawn from the distribution ν . A bid strategy ν is called pure if it is a Dirac measure ν = ε p of some point p ∈ J . For ν ∈ M 1 (J), we agree to write ν N for the product measure
..,N } , the probability that the agent j ∈ {0, . . . , N } is in merit depends on the number of bids paced in front of his/her own bid. Let us explain how it is be determined. The system operator puts in front of the agent j all bids x i with prices x i < x j and after the agent's bid those with x i > x j . For competitors bidding at the same price x i = x j , a fair decision rule has to be applied. A suggesting procedure is to decide by some random procedure which gives all bidders the same chance. . That after, the priority numbers are assigned to the bid prices. The system operator arranges the bids in the increasing price order, and in the case of overlap x i = x j , the bid with the lower priority number is to be placed first. Since the distribution of priority numbers is continuous, they are almost surely different and so this procedure establishes a well-defined bid list. To make this concept precise, we introduce the rank r j ( x, z) of the agent j given for the bid prices
Note that the ranks satisfy 
of each agent j = 0, . . . , N is equally distributed:
holds for all ω ∈ Ω, x ∈ J {0,...,N } and ρ ∈ S N +1 , and so we conclude that the distribution of R ρ coincides with that of R since both random variables (ω,
That is, the distribution of R is permutation-invariant, hence it is the normalized Haar measure on S N +1 which equals to the uniform distribution (see [3] ), showing (14).
Suppose that within one hour, the production unit causes the fixed costs p f ∈ J (USD/MWh), the variable production costs p v ∈ J (USD/MWh), and full production costs p f v := p f + p v ∈ J . Then for submitted bids x ∈ J {0,...,N } the gain of the agent j is given by
Here the payment prices
are symmetric, similarly to (13):
For j ∈ {0, . . . , N }, we fix ρ ∈ S N +1 with ρ(j) = 0 to consider
which is for (p, x) ∈ J {0,...,N } interpreted as the gain of the agent j bidding p ∈ J whereas his/her competitors
To study the distribution of (17), we restrict to the case j = 0, since our model is symmetric. Define for all p ∈ J and
Lemma 2. The joint distribution of (17) equals to that of (G x (p)) p∈J, x∈J N .
Proof. Let p ∈ J , x ∈ J N and fix ρ ∈ S N +1 with ρ(j) = 0, then
On the other hand, we have
The result follows since the distribution of (Q, Z ρ −1 ) equals to that of (Q, Z).
Note that the left and the right limits of p → I x (p) exist:
In the present work, we study electricity auctions, where the paid price is increasing
never falls below the own bid price
never exceeds those system price, which would be dispatched without agent's bid
and depends continuously on the own bid price
Note that both (21) and (22) together imply that
To give some examples of payment prices, we recall three auction types from above. The corresponding π x (p) := Π 0 ((p, x) , Q) is given for all p ∈ J and x ∈ J N as π x (p) = p for the discriminatory auction, 
The market equilibrium
For p ∈ J , we agree to denote by Q,
respectively. Given a strictly increasing, convex utility function U ∈ C(R), we define for each p ∈ J and ν ∈ M 1 (J) the utility functional
which evaluates the agent's strategy to bid at the price p ∈ J whereas his/her competitors offer independently random bids drawn from the distribution ν ∈ M 1 (J). For later use of the Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem, we point out that (U (G(p))) p∈J are bounded
An equilibrium strategy ν * ∈ M 1 (J) is characterized by the property, that, if all competitors follow ν * , then the best choice of the agent is to do the same. We use the notation
to give a characterization of equilibrium strategies.
is impossible, since otherwise we obtain J U(p, ν * )ν * (dp) < S(ν * ), hence there would exist a
showing that ν * is not a maximizer of (27). On the other hand, if (28) holds, then U(p, ν * ) = S(ν * ) for ν -almost all p ∈ J , that is, J U(p, ν * )ν * (dp) = S(ν * ).
To illustrate the above lemma, we calculate the equilibrium strategies for the case P (Q ≤ cN ) = 1 of production capacity surplus. Not surprisingly, we find out that all producers will bid at the variable production costs in this situation. Suppose that all competitors bid at p v . If the agent bids at p < p v , then he/she produces in any case. We have
If the agent bids at p = p v , then it depends on his rank in the bid list whether he/she is scheduled to produce. In the case {I(p v ) < Q} of production, the paid price for all three auctions is p v , since we are in the situation of (24):
That is, if p = p v , then for all three auctions holds
In the case of the bid price p > p v , the agent never produces and earns
independently on the auction format.
For all three auctions, we see that p → U(p, ε p v ) is in fact maximal at p = p v with value U (−cp f ), which yields from (28) the equilibrium characterization of ν * = ε p v . An interesting observation here is that for all three auctions, the supremum S(ν * ) = U (−cp f ) is the same and is also reached at the price cap
This feature turns out to be true in general: we shall see that at the equilibrium ν * , the supremum S(ν * ) is always reached at the price cap. Moreover, this value depends neither on the auction type nor on its particular equilibrium. This property serves the revenue equivalence theorem proven in the last section.
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First, we show that for each auction, for an arbitrary equilibrium ν , a strategy which offers prices sufficiently close to the price cap is not outperformed by any other strategy. The proof is based on the observation, that if, on the contrary, there are inefficient pure bid strategies near the cap
then the competitors would not bid there: ν([p, p]) = 0 for all p > p due to (28) and so a bid on p would not be less attractive than that on p since the probability that agent is in merit is the same.
(
ii) The left limit A := lim y↑sup J U(y, ν) exists and does not depend on ν :
(iii) For all p ∈ J , there exist the limits
(iii) Since for all x ∈ J and ω ∈ Ω the function I x (·)(ω) takes a finite number of values, we
Again, (25) and the dominated convergence yield the assertion.
(iv) If x ∈ (J \ {p}) N then we have the continuity on p:
and deduce with (25) that lim y→p U(y, ν) = U(p, ν).
(v) For x ∈ J N and p, y ∈ J with p < y we calculate
which gives with (23) the right limit
where the last equation follows from (24). Consequently, we have
(which simply means that p > p v ). Moreover, we have the strict positivity
The left limit is obtained by the same arguments
Finally, we need for x ∈ J N the estimation
where in the first inequality holds due to
and in the third inequality we use P (Z 0 > max N j=1 Z j ) = (N + 1) −1 and the independence of (I − x (p), Q, I + x (p)) and Z , see (19) and (18). Combine now (37) with positivity (35) to obtain
showing with (34) that (36) is in fact negative.
(vi) In view of (ii), we have S(ν) ≥ A. We prove that the strict inequality does not hold.
Suppose on the contrary that S(ν) > A. Since ν is an equilibrium strategy, we have
and from (ii) it follows that
The inequality
is impossible, since otherwise (28) gives ν({p}) = 0 and (iv) yields the continuity of U(·, ν) on p giving with (38) that U(p, ν) = lim y↑p U(y, ν) = S(ν) and contradicting so to (39). Hence, we have U(p, ν) = S(ν) which implies that one of two cases occurs:
, we obtain in the first case from (40) that
contradicting to (38) by (41). In the second case, we obtain from
which is impossible due to (26).
The revenue equivalence
Let us finally state our main result: if all producers are not risk-averse (42) U (r) = r for all r ∈ R and follow an equilibrium strategy ν , then the expected payment
for the produced electricity depends neither on the auction type nor on its particular equilibrium. Proof. By the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 2, we obtain that
Now, we to calculate the second summand of (45) using the independence of Q and I(p) as J E P ⊗ν N (1 {Q>I(p)} )ν(dp) = 
Conclusion
The revenue equivalence theorem for classical auctions (see [7] ) enjoys a considerable interest, since it works out conditions ensuring that the auctioneer's revenue does not depend on the auction type. Among them, the most crucial assumption is that all market participants are not risk-averse (also required in our approach by (42)). Although this presumption is not justified for real markets, the revenue equivalence theorem provides a starting point for further considerations (see [8] ). For electricity auctions, a refinement of our results is needed to describe several technologies and multiple schedules, since in the real-world electricity auctions, each market player uses in general many units of different technologies.
